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ARGHYA GHOSH* & MUNIRUL NABIN HAQUE**
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ABSTRACT We analyse the incentives and welfare implications of costly technology
adoption in a two-period duopoly model where ﬁrms have diﬀerent amounts of capital.
We also extend our framework to an open economy set-up and examine the relationship
between trade and technology adoption. Our ﬁndings are as follows. First, no monotone
relationship exists between the threshold cost of adoption and capital shares. Second, an
unequal distribution of capital, despite lessening competition, can increase total surplus.
Third, trade generally encourages adoption of modern technology unless the share of
capital for the adopters is too low.
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Introduction
Adoption of new technologies typically occur sequentially. For example,
during the Agricultural Revolution in the United Kingdom in 18th century
only a few landlords initially experimented with the new crop rotation
system. Later, observing the success of the experiments, other farmers
imitated the new practices (Beckett, 1990; Thirsk, 1985). Similar sequential
adoption patterns of High Yield Varieties (HYVs) were observed during
Green Revolution in 1960s. A prominent and relatively recent example is the
adoption of the basic oxygen furnace (BOF). The technology was developed
in 1949, but the major producers in the American steel industry waited until
1964 to adopt it. In 1968 only 12.2 per cent of the US steel capacity made
use of BOF. It was not until 1980 that number rose to 80 per cent, indicating
a general proﬁtability of BOF (Oster, 1982; Sumrall, 1982). In the ﬁnancial
sector, the sequential adoption of automated teller machines (ATMs) in the
United Kingdom is documented in Gourlay and Pentecost (2002).
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The lack of immediate and uniform adoption of new technological
innovations has been attributed to factors such as lack of credit, limited
access to information, aversion to risk and inadequate ﬁrm/farm size.
However, evidence shows that despite adoption of several policies to remove
the constraints by introducing facilities to provide information, credit and
proper infrastructure, the immediate adoption of new technological innova-
tion is quite rare (Feder et al., 1985). An alternative view, that came to
dominate the theoretical literature on technology adoption since early 1980s, is
that the adoption decisions are strategic.1 More speciﬁcally, whether a ﬁrm
adopts a new technology or not depends crucially on the behaviour of its rival
ﬁrms in the industry. This literature, focusing on the strategic approach, also
ﬁnds that ex-ante symmetric ﬁrms can adopt technology at diﬀerent dates.
Taking the sequential feature as given – which is overwhelmingly
supported both empirically and theoretically (as mentioned above) – we
analyse the incentives and welfare implications of costly technology
adoption in a two-period duopoly model where ﬁrms have diﬀerent
amounts of capital. How does a diﬀerence in capital holdings aﬀect the
incentives to adopt technology? Does an increase in inequality in
distribution of capital necessarily lower welfare? By analysing these
questions – which are only meaningful in asymmetric set-up – our analysis
contributes to the existing theoretical literature on technology adoption,
which has generally focused on positive aspects in a symmetric set-up with
constant marginal costs.2 In addition in an extension of our framework we
examine the relationship between trade and technology adoption – an issue
that has generally been discussed under symmetric set-up.
Here is a sketch of the model. There are two ﬁrms, ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B say,
with diﬀerent amounts of capital, which in conjunction with labour produces
output using traditional or modern technology. There are two periods, each
with two stages – technology adoption (ﬁrst stage) and Cournot competition
(second stage). To highlight the normative aspects of sequential adoption, we
assume from the outset, only one of the ﬁrms, say ﬁrm A, has access to the
modern technology. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrm A decides whether or not to
adopt a modern technology, incurring a one-time ﬁxed cost, after which ﬁrms
non-cooperatively choose quantities (i.e. Cournot competition) to maximize
proﬁts. If ﬁrm A adopts the modern technology in the ﬁrst period, then ﬁrm
B can observe and adopt it costlessly in the second period. However if ﬁrm A
does not adopt in period 1 ﬁrm B could not adopt it in period 2. Once the
adoption decision is made by ﬁrm B in the ﬁrst stage of period 2, ﬁrms engage
in Cournot competition once again.
Trading oﬀ the ﬁrst-period gains from using modern technology with the
loss of the cost advantage in the second period and the ﬁxed cost, we ﬁnd
that ﬁrm A adopts the technology only if the ﬁxed cost is lower than a
certain threshold. We ﬁnd that the threshold cost of adoption is non-
monotone in the share of capital of ﬁrm A which implies that for some
parameterizations small ﬁrms might adopt technology while large ﬁrms do
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not. Jensen (2004) has shown that, in the presence of multiplant economies,
small ﬁrms might adopt an innovation while large ﬁrms do not. In order to
adopt, a ﬁrm must shut down one plant to learn about the innovation. In the
presence of signiﬁcant multiplant economies, shutdown creates a disadvan-
tage and hence large ﬁrms might not have the incentive to adopt. Our
analysis provides another channel. Although Jensen’s (2004) argument is
appropriate for industries in developed countries, ours is probably more
applicable in an agrarian context in developing economies.
The absence of a monotone relationship between technology adoption
and ﬁrm size is documented in the empirical literature on technology
adoption. Although Schumpeter (1934) argued that the large ﬁrms with
greater resources have higher incentives to adopt new technology, evidence
suggests that in some industries small ﬁrms are more likely to adopt new
technology and bring it to the market ﬁrst (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Cohen &
Levinthal, 1989). Similarly, in the agrarian context, although some
historians suggest that the large farms were the ﬁrst to introduce new
practices during the Agricultural revolution in the UK in the 18th century
and in the Green Revolution in India in the 1960s, there is little empirical
evidence supporting this view. For example, in adoption of HYVs in the two
states in India – Punjab and Tamilnadu – Sen (1974) ﬁnds no correlation
between farm size and technology adoption. Hayami (1981) cited evidence
from Barker and Herdt’s study of 30 villages in South Asia showing that the
relationship between the adoption of modern rice varieties and absolute
farm size for a cross country pooled sample is negative.
Interestingly, in our framework, even though the technology is available
costlessly at a later date, we ﬁnd that adoption of better technology by ﬁrm
A might lower the total proﬁts of ﬁrm B and hence ﬁrm B might resist the
technology adoption by ﬁrm A. During the Agricultural Revolution in the
UK, and the Green Revolution in India, although the inventions of a new
crop rotation system, high-yield varieties brought remarkable changes to
agricultural production, only a few landlords adopted these new inventions3
and indeed there was evidence of resistance towards adoption. Our analysis
oﬀers a possible reason for such resistance.
Immiserization with adoption of better technology has also been shown in
the licensing literature. Kamien and Tauman (1986) showed that despite
adoption of better technology, all ﬁrms in an oligopolistic industry can be
worse oﬀ. Exploiting the competition among oligoplistic ﬁrms to her
advantage the licensor (an independent innovator) sets a fee such that the
gains from better technology are outweighed by the losses from fees.4 As in
licensing, oligopolistic interaction is important in our framework as well.
However, unlike licensing, there is no explicit payment from B to A as
technology adoption is costless. Implicitly however, there is a fee, or more
appropriately a cost, that B bears – reduction in proﬁts in the ﬁrst period.
For some parameterizations, this reduction in second period proﬁts can
oﬀset the gains from free technology in the ﬁrst period.
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Our analysis also sheds light on the relationship between distribution of
capital and social surplus. In the absence of technology adoption, the
surplus is maximum when capital is equally distributed. However, we ﬁnd
that a slightly unequal distribution of capital can increase total surplus when
the possibility of technology adoption is introduced. This ﬁnding is
compatible with the Indian experience of the Green Revolution. Punjab, a
northern state in India, which underwent little land reforms beneﬁted more
from the introduction of new HYVs while West Bengal, with more
egalitarian distribution, has not beneﬁted to the same extent.
In the ﬁnal section we examine the relationship between trade and
technology adoption where we show that trade generally encourages
technology adoption unless the share of the adopter is low. Trade increases
the market size which in turn increases the incentive to adopt better
technology as the cost reduction spreads over a larger number of units.
However, it also increases competition. If the ﬁrm A – the ﬁrst adopter – has
low capital and accordingly high cost of production then the increased
competition might reduce the incentives for technology adoption. This
ﬁnding suggests though that the opponents of the import-substitution
policies are generally right that protection does not provide adequate
incentives for technology adoption, while our analysis suggests that, for a
small region, especially one with low capital (which in our framework
translates to a high cost of production), a temporary protection might
induce adoption of better technology.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents a two-period model of sequential technology adoption. The section
after outlines the basic results. The fourth section extends the basic
framework to an open economy set-up and analyses the relationship
between trade and technology adoption. The ﬁnal section concludes.
Model
Consider an industry consisting of two ﬁrms, ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B, producing a
homogeneous product. The inverse demand for the product in period
t(¼ 1,2) is:
Pt ¼ 1 qAt  qBt ð1Þ
where qit (i¼A,B) and Pt respectively denote the output produced by ﬁrm i
and the price in period t. Using capital (kit) and labour (lit), each ﬁrm i
produces qit according to production technology
qit ¼ litk
1
2
it l
1
2
it ð2Þ
where lit is a technology parameter. Depending on which technology the
ﬁrm uses, i.e. modern or traditional, the parameter lit can assume two
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values, M (for modern) or T (for traditional) where M4T¼ 1. For the
remainder of the analysis we consider the case where the modern technology
is twice more productive than the traditional one, i.e. M¼ 2.
We assume that the aggregate amount of capital is ﬁxed. Let k denote the
ﬁxed amount of capital and let kA¼ kA1¼ kA2¼ yk and kB¼ kB1¼
kB2¼ (17 y)k denote the capital owned by the ﬁrms A and B respectively
where y2 (0,1). The assumption of ﬁxed capital ﬁts well with an agrarian
set-up if we interpret land as capital. In the industrial context, this
assumption is justiﬁed for the short run analysis. Regarding labour markets,
we assume that the labour market is perfectly competitive and ﬁrms can hire
labour at competitive wage which we normalize to unity.6
We consider the following two-period game.
Period 1. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrm A decides whether or not to adopt the
modern technology incurring a one-time cost c. Adoption of the modern
technology increases lA1 from T to M. Following adoption decisions, there
is Cournot competition between the two ﬁrms.
Period 2. In the second period, ﬁrm B adopts the modern technology
costlessly if lA1¼M, otherwise ﬁrm B cannot adopt. Once again, after the
adoption decisions are made, ﬁrms compete in quantities (i.e. Cournot
competition).
The structure of the game implies that technology adoption (if it occurs) is
sequential. In particular, there is a ﬁxed order of adoption. Firm A adopts
the technology in the ﬁrst period (if at all) and then in the second period ﬁrm
B decides whether to adopt or not. Although this simpliﬁed structure is
adopted to focus on the welfare consequences of sequential technology
adoption some justiﬁcation is necessary. One way to interpret this ﬁxed
order of adoption is as follows (see Jensen, 1992b, for a similar
interpretation). Suppose A owns the patent to the modern technology.
Then the ‘length’ of the ﬁrst period could be interpreted as the length of
patent protection and the length of the second period would be the
remainder of the eﬀective life of innovation. Indeed, in that case, the periods
do not have to be of the same length as we assume here. All our results here
would hold under that alternative structure with suitably chosen lengths of
periods.
Analysis
We ﬁrst analyse the Cournot competition. In each period t(¼ 1,2), after
the adoption decisions have been made, taking qjt as well as (lit,ljt) as
given, each ﬁrm i(¼A,B) chooses its output qit to maximize period t
proﬁts,
pit ¼ ð1 qit  qjtÞqit  fitðqit; kiÞ ð3Þ
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where fitðqit; kiÞ  ðqitlitÞ
2ð1kiÞ denote the period t cost function for ﬁrm i. The
standard proﬁt maximization exercise yields:
qitðlAt; lBtÞ ¼
2

1þ 1
l2jtkj

 1
4

1þ 1
l2itki

1þ 1
l2jtkj

 1
; ð4Þ
and
pitðlAt; lBtÞ ¼ ½qitðlit; ljtÞ2

1þ 1
l2itki

ð5Þ
where i, j 2 {A,B}, i 6¼ j.
Now we turn to analyse the adoption decisions. From the structure of the
game it immediately follows that lB1¼T. If lA1¼M then lA2¼M holds as
well but more importantly lB2¼M since it is costless forB to adopt the modern
technology in the second period. On, the other hand if lA1¼T, lA2¼ lB2¼T.
That is, if ﬁrm A does not adopt the modern technology in the ﬁrst period then
adopting it in the second period is not worthwhile either. As explained in the
description of the game, if ﬁrmA does not adopt themodern technology, ﬁrmB
cannot adopt on its own. Since lA1 – the adoption decision by ﬁrm A in period
1 – determines all the relevant adoption decisions and consequently outputs and
proﬁts, we denote the overall proﬁts of ﬁrm i as pi (lA1). Equations (6) and (7)
respectively, denote the overall proﬁts for ﬁrm i (excluding the cost of
technology adoption) under modern and traditional technologies:
piðMÞ ¼ pi1ðM;TÞ þ pi2ðM;MÞ ð6Þ
piðTÞ ¼ pi1ðT;TÞ þ pi2ðT;TÞ ð7Þ
Since M4T, clearly pA1(M,T )4 pA1(T,T ) holds. Also the duopoly proﬁts
are higher under modern technology implying pA2(M,M )4 pA2(T,T ). This
suggests that pA(M )4 pA(T ) and ﬁrm A would adopt modern technology
provided the c pA(M )7 pA(T ).
Proposition 1
(i) Firm A adopts the modern technology if c cp, where
cp M
2kAð1þM 2kAÞð2þT 2kBÞ2
ð4þ4M 2kAþ4T 2kBþ3M 2T 2kAkBÞ2
þ M
2kAð1þM 2kAÞð2þM 2kBÞ2
ð4þ4M 2kAþ4M 2kBþ3M 4kAkBÞ2
 2T
2kAð1þT 2kAÞð2þT 2kBÞ2
ð4þ4T 2kAþ4T 2kBþ3T 4kAkBÞ2
kA ¼ yk; kB ¼ ð1 yÞk; y2 ð0;1Þ:
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(ii) There exists y* 2 (0,1) such that for all y4 y*, cp is strictly decreasing in
k provided k> 12. However for low values of y, cp can be increasing in k.
(iii) There exists a threshold k* such that cp is non-monotone in y for k4 k*.
In Figure 1, we plot the threshold cost of technology adoption (i.e. cp), for
several values of k, which highlights the properties of the threshold
mentioned in the Proposition. We interpret that a low value of k
corresponds to a capital-poor industry while a high value of k corresponds
to a capital-rich industry.
First, we explain the relationship between cp and k. From the quadratic
cost speciﬁcation ðfit ¼ ðqitlitÞ
2ð 1kitÞÞ, it follows that in a capital-rich industry,
the cost of production for ﬁrm A – the ﬁrm that decides whether or not to
adopt the technology – is lower. This implies that the incentive to adopt
technology is lower in a capital rich industry. Indeed this reasoning works
provided ﬁrm A’s share of capital, y, is larger than a certain threshold and k
is not too low. For example, observe that in Figure 1, for y4 0.5, the higher
the value of k the lower the value of cp. However, in a duopoly framework,
the strategic considerations are also important. If ﬁrm A has little share of
capital (i.e. y is small) and it does not adopt the technology, the strategic
disadvantage from being the high-cost ﬁrm is greater in a capital-rich
industry. This consideration implies that if small ﬁrms are primarily the
adopters, technology is likely to be adopted more in a capital-rich industry.
Figure 1 shows that this is indeed the case. For y5 0.2, cp increases with k.
Now we turn to examine the relationship between cp and y. Consider the
values at the two extremes – e.g. y5 0.05 and y4 0.95. In this range, we
ﬁnd that cp increases with y. This conﬁrms the Schumpeterian notion that an
increase in ﬁrm size might create a higher incentive to adopt a modern
Figure 1. Threshold cost (cp) of technology adoption for k¼ 1/2, 1, 2 and 5
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technology. Although unproﬁtable for a smaller ﬁrm, incurring the cost of
adoption might be worthwhile for a larger ﬁrm with more resources. In our
framework, the large ﬁrm also has a large share in the output market and
hence the aggregate cost reduction can be larger. However, the quadratic
cost speciﬁcation implies that owning large amounts of capital itself results
in lower cost, and the incentives to lower the cost further through adoption
of technology are less for a ﬁrm with large share of capital. The interaction
of these two eﬀects can generate non-monotonicity in the cp schedule with
respect to y. The non-monotonicity is strikingly borne out in Figure 2 for
k¼ 2 and k¼ 5. Note that for a capital-poor industry, owning a large share
of capital still implies a small amount of capital overall and the cost reduc-
tion owing to a larger share is not too large and hence the Schumpeterian
argument – the larger the ﬁrm, the greater is the likelihood of technology
adoption – goes through. Indeed we do not ﬁnd any non-monotonicity in
the cp schedule for k ¼ 12 or k¼ 1.
The only work we are aware of which shows that small ﬁrms can adopt
ﬁrst is Jensen (2004). The large ﬁrm, in his framework, have multiple plants
and, in order to adopt, a ﬁrm must shut down one plant to learn about the
innovation. In the presence of signiﬁcant multiplant economies, shutdown
creates a disadvantage and hence large ﬁrms might not have the incentive to
adopt. Although Jensen’s (2004) argument is appropriate for industries in
developed countries, ours is probably more applicable in agrarian context in
developing economies.
Before we turn to discuss the eﬀect of technology adoption on a rival ﬁrm
(i.e. ﬁrm B) here is a summary of the ﬁndings hitherto. First, if the small
ﬁrms are the main adopters in a developing economy then adoption is likely
to occur more in capital-rich industries while the reverse is true if large ﬁrms
Figure 2. Plotting pB(M )7pB(T ) for K¼ 1/2, 1, 2 and 5
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are the ones that mainly adopt technology. Second, provided the amount of
capital is higher than a threshold in an industry, there is generally no
monotone relationship between the share of capital of the adopter and the
likelihood of adoption.
Resistance to Technology Adoption
There are several instances, especially in the agrarian context, where an
individual or a group has met severe resistance in adopting technology. For
example, in the UK, during the Agricultural Revolution (1750 – 1830), some
landlords resisted the adoption of new technology as the adoption of new
inventions increased the cost of production, which in turn reduced the proﬁt
levels (Deane, 1969). In our framework, resistance can occur if pB is lower
with modern technology. Below we discuss whether pB can indeed be lower
with technology adoption.
There are two eﬀects of technology adoption on ﬁrm B’s proﬁts, which act
in opposite directions. Adoption of technology by ﬁrm A leads to higher
qA1, and lower qB1 (since outputs are strategic substitutes), which in turn
leads to lower pB1. In the second period however, the modern technology is
costlessly available and its usage by ﬁrm B increases qB2, which in turn
increases pB2. Provided the available capital is not too small, and the shares
of capital between ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B are not too diﬀerent we ﬁnd that
pB: pB1þ pB2 can indeed be lower with technology adoption.
Proposition 2
For all k  kð>0Þ, there exists y1(k) and y2(k) satisfying 05 y1(k)5
y2 (k)5 1 such that pB(M )5 pB(T ) for all y 2 (y1(k), y2(k)).
Figure 2 plots the values of pB(M )7pB(T ) corresponding to k ¼ 12; 1,2 and 5.
Consider low values of y. Recall, y refers to the share of the capital held
by the adopter, i.e. ﬁrm A. Hence, y is low implies that ﬁrm B is large, and
consequently the reduction of its proﬁts in the ﬁrst period is not very much,
especially when compared to the gains from using the ‘free technology’ in
the second period over large levels of output. As y increases, ﬁrm B becomes
smaller and hence the increase in pB2 from ‘free technology’ is lower. Also
the reduction in pB1 is higher since with an increase in y – which reduces the
size diﬀerences between the adopter and the non-adopter – the strategic
disadvantage from non-adoption increases. In fact, note from Figure 2 that
for k¼ 2 and y 2 (0.07, 0.53), pB(M ) is actually lower than pB(T ). Similarly
for k¼ 5, we ﬁnd that for y 2 (0.01, 0.60) pB(M ) is also lower than pB(T ).
Note that the possibility that ﬁrm B is worse oﬀ with technology adoption,
does not arise for low values of k. In the capital-poor industry the initial
marginal cost is too high and the gains from reduction in marginal cost in
period 2 for ﬁrm B outweighs any losses in the ﬁrst period. Finally, for
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large values of y (i.e. relatively small ﬁrm B), once again the strategic
considerations become less important. The signiﬁcant reduction in marginal
cost in the period 2 and corresponding increase in pB2 outweigh other
considerations.
That ﬁrms can be worse oﬀ with adoption of better technology is well
known in the licensing literature. Kamien and Tauman (1986) showed that
in licensing with a ﬁxed fee, the licensor (an independent innovator), by
exploiting the competition among oligoplistic ﬁrms to her advantage, makes
all the licensees worse oﬀ. In particular, the fees that the licensees pay are
greater than the increase in proﬁts resulting from using a lower cost
technology. The immiserization of licensees holds when the licensing occurs
through auction as well.7 As in licensing, strategic interaction is important in
our framework as well. However, unlike licensing, there is no explicit
payment from B to A as technology adoption is costless. Implicitly however,
there is a fee or, more appropriately, a cost that B bears – reduction in
proﬁts in the ﬁrst period. In licensing, the gains from better technology can
be outweighed by the losses from fees while in our analysis the gains from
free technology in the second period can be more than oﬀset by reduced
proﬁts in the ﬁrst period.
Now we turn to determine the total surplus. Recall that the parameter
lA1(¼M,T ) is suﬃcient to determine all other technology parameters (lit)
and consequently the equilibrium values of the relevant variables. In our
partial equilibrium framework, the overall consumer surplus for a given lA1,
denoted by CS(lA1) is the sum of consumer surplus in each period, i.e.
CS1ðlA1Þ þ CS2ðlA2Þ  ðQ1ðlA1ÞÞ
2þðQ2ðlA2ÞÞ2
2 , where Qt(.) denotes the aggregate
quantity sold in period t(¼ 1,2). The total surplus for a given lA1 is given by
SðlA1Þ ¼ CSðlA1Þ þ pAðlA1Þ þ pBðlA1Þ  dc ð8Þ
where d¼ 1 if lA1¼M and d¼ 0 otherwise.
Distribution of Capital and Total Surplus
In the absence of the possibility of technology adoption, for any k, equal
distribution of capital (i.e. y ¼ 12) maximizes total surplus. Since the
marginal cost is increasing in output, a given level of output is produced
at a minimum cost, when capital is equally distributed among two ﬁrms.
This also creates more competition in the product market. Both these
forces suggest the social surplus is higher the more equal is the distribu-
tion. In an agrarian context where capital can be interpreted as land
this explains the rationale behind the land reform policy adopted in
several regions. However, the policy of land reform may not be the most
beneﬁcial for an economy given the possibility of sequential technology
adoption.
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Proposition 3
Absent the possibility of technology adoption y ¼ 12 maximizes the social
surplus. However, in the presence of possibility of technology adoption, equal
distribution of capital, i.e. y ¼ 12, does not usually maximize the social surplus.
There are two possible scenarios. First, cost of technology adoption might
be such that the modern technology is not adopted in the economy where
capital is equally distributed while it is adopted in the economy where
capital is unequally distributed. Adoption of better technology can lead to
relatively higher surplus in a region with unequal distribution of capital. For
instance, if k¼ 1 and y 1/2 then cep  cup where superscripts e,u denote
equal and unequal distribution of k respectively. In this case for any
cp 2 ðcep; cupÞ, total surplus will be higher for an economy with unequal
distribution of k (where modern technology is adopted).
A more interesting scenario is when c5 cp holds for both equal and
unequal distribution and yet the total surplus is higher with unequal
distribution. There are two eﬀects at work. If y > 12, then technology
adoption by ﬁrm A implies that the modern technology is combined with a
larger amount of capital in the initial period and cost reduction is achieved
for more units of production. However, since the technology used is same
for both ﬁrms A and B in the second period (irrespective of whether
technology is adopted or not) unequal distribution of capital lowers surplus
in period 2. The former eﬀect might dominate, which suggests that unequal
distribution might lead to higher total surplus.
Trade and Technology Adoption
In this section we consider an extension of our framework to examine the
relationship between trade and technology adoption. Several developing
countries have often adopted protectionist policies to help ﬁrms improve
their eﬃciency. While the proponents of the import-substitution policy
argue that the ﬁrms need protection in their early stages to compete
eﬀectively in the world market, the opponents say that the incentive to adopt
modern technology is minimal in the absence of competition. This debate
motivates us to explore the link between trade and technology adoption in
our framework.
Consider an industry with two ﬁrms, ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B, which are located
in the regions RA and RB respectively where the industry-speciﬁc capital in
region A is kA while that in region B is kB. To facilitate the comparison
with our analysis in the previous section we assume that kA¼ yk and
kB¼ (17 y)k respectively where k denotes the total amount of capital in the
industry. Firm i is located in region Ri and in each period t it faces the
demand qit ¼ 12 Pt2 . The wage rate in each country is normalized to unity. In
autarky (i.e. in absence of trade), each ﬁrm i, a monopolist in its own region
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Ri chooses qit to maximize (17 2qit)qit7 li where qi ¼ lk1=2i l1=2i and
accordingly li ¼ q
2
i
l2ki
. The maximization problem yields
qmi ¼
1
2

2þ 1
l2i ki
 ð9Þ
pmi ¼
1
4

2þ 1
l2i ki
 ð10Þ
where qmi and P
m
i (i¼A,B) respectively denote the equilibrium output and
proﬁts per period for the monopolist i and ki¼ yk for i¼A and 17 yk for
i¼B.
Note that, neither the equilibrium outcomes nor the technology
parameter li has time subscript (t). If ﬁrm i adopts the technology, it either
adopts in period 1, which implies lit¼M for t¼ 1,2, or it does not adopt at
all, in which case lit¼T for t¼ 1,2. Thus, equilibrium outcomes in the two
periods are identical. Let pmi ðMÞ and pmi ðTÞ respectively denote the proﬁts of
ﬁrm i per period with modern and traditional technology. A monopolist will
adopt modern technology if and only if the following holds:
c < cpðmÞ  2½pmi ðMÞ  pmi ðTÞ 
kiðM 2  T 2Þ
2M 2T 2ð2M 2ki þ 1Þð2T 2ki þ 1Þ ð11Þ
where ki¼ yk, y 2 (0,1). As before, we ﬁnd that cp(m) is non-monotone
in y. Figure 3 shows the two thresholds, cp and cp(m), for a particular
parameterization (namely K¼ 1, M¼ 2 and T¼ 1).
Figure 3. Cp versus Cp(m) for K¼ 1, M¼ 2 and T¼ 1
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Note that, for intermediate values of y, which includes (y¼ 0.5) we ﬁnd
trade is conducive to technology adoption. Indeed, the proposition indicates
that this property is fairly general.
Proposition 4
Let cp and cp(m) denote the threshold costs of technology adoption for a ﬁrm
with capital yk (y 2 (0,1)) under autarky and trade respectively. For all k4 0,
there exists y; y satisfying 0 < y  y < 1 such that8
(i) cp5 cp(m) for y < y, and
(ii) cp4 cp(m) for y > y.
The Proposition says that for low values of y, the incentive to technology is
higher under monopoly. In other words if the ﬁrm with a small amount of
capital is the adopter then its incentives to adopt are higher under autarky
than in the trade regime. On the other hand, if y is large, i.e. large ﬁrm is
mainly the adopter, its incentives to adopt are higher under the trade regime.
The logic of this result is as follows. As countries open up, market size
doubles, which increases the incentive to adopt for large as well as small
adopters. However, there is also an increase in competition following trade.
The market structure switches from monopoly to duopoly. The increase in
competition is, however, less for the large ﬁrm, due to their high capital
stock and low cost. Thus, if large ﬁrms are adopters, market size eﬀect
dominates and, consequently, the incentives to adopt increase with opening
up to trade. On the other hand, if small ﬁrms are adopters then the
competition eﬀect might adversely aﬀect the incentives to adopt as suggested
in the Proposition. Overall, our analysis suggests that whether trade
discourages or encourages technology adoption might well depend on the
size of the domestic industry.
Conclusion
We analyse the incentives and welfare implications of costly technology
adoption in a two-period Cournot duopoly model where ﬁrms have diﬀerent
amounts of capital. Theoretically our analysis complements the existing
work on technology adoption, which has typically focused on positive
aspects in a symmetric set-up. In an extension of our framework we also
analyse the relationship between trade and technology adoption. A
limitation of our analysis, which is applicable to both the closed economy
and open economy set-up is our choice of deterministic framework, which
by deﬁnition, excludes uncertainty – an important consideration in adoption
of new technologies (Jensen, 1992a). In our framework, the presence of ﬁxed
cost for the ﬁrst adopter and zero cost of the adoption for the second
resembles uncertainty models where the ﬁxed cost can be interpreted as the
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cost of risk-taking.9 However, a rigorous treatment of uncertainty in the
presence of asymmetric ﬁrms requires more serious modiﬁcations in the
model, which we leave for future research.
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Notes
1 See Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for pioneering works in the strategic
approach. Also see Hoppe (2001) for a survey of this literature.
2 For discussion on the normative issues in symmetric constant marginal cost set-up see Jensen
(1992a), Magnac and Verdier (1993). Also see Mills and Smith (1996) and Elberfeld (2003) for
a discussion on related issues in a single period model of technology adoption.
3 See Ernle (1961).
4 For comprehensive discussion on patent licensing and diﬀerent payment mechanisms see
Kamien (1992).
5 The theoretical research in this area suggests that whether ﬁrms adopt better technology
or more generally eﬃcient practices could well depend on the speciﬁc details of the model.
See Tybout (2001) for a discussion. Analysing diﬀusion of 20 technologies across 23 of the
world’s leading industrial economies Comin and Hobijn (2004) reports that the degree of
openness to trade is one of the most important determinants of the speed of technology
adoption.
6 We assume competitive labour markets to focus on the strategic interaction in the product
market. We conjecture that a similar analysis would go through if we consider strategic
interaction in the labour market and assume that the product markets are perfectly
competitive. The alternative choice would have been more appropriate in the agrarian
context. See Ray (1999) for a duopsony model of the agrarian labour markets.
7 For comprehensive discussion on patent licensing see Kamien’s survey in Handbook of Game
Theory.
8 Figure 3 suggests that y ¼ y. Although this holds for all values of k we have checked for we
could not prove analytically that this holds for all values of k.
9 Also, the fact that ﬁrm B can adopt the technology costlessly in the second period can be
interpreted as uncertainty is resolved once the technology has been tested by ﬁrm A.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The ﬁrst part of the proof follows from the discussion leading to
Proposition 1.
(ii) We ﬁnd that limy!1
dcp
dk ¼  32 ð4k
21Þ
ð1þ4k2Þð1þkÞ2 which is strictly negative
if k > 12, implying that for all k >
1
2, there exists a y* such that for all
y4 y*, cp is strictly decreasing in k. The second half of Proposition (ii)
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follows from observing Figure 1 and noting that for y5 0.04, cp
increases as k increases.
(iii) Since (a) cp is continuous in y, (b) limy!0 cp ¼ 0 and (c) cp4 0 for y ¼ 12
it follows that there exists y0 < 12 such that
dcp
dy > 0 for y < y
0. On
the other hand we have limy!1=2
dcp
dy ¼  3kZð4þ3k2þ10kÞ3ð1þ3k2þ4kÞð16þ3k2þ16kÞ,
where Z¼7 (126k8þ 1200k7þ 4055k6þ 4814k572844k4711808k37
10432k273840k7512) is strictly positive for all k4 1.4 implying
dcp
dy < 0 for all k4 1.4. This implies the result.
Proof of Proposition 2
Using equations (5), (6) and (7), and substituting y ¼ 12 we have that
pBðMÞ  pBðTÞ ¼ 3kð81k
6þ324k5þ108k4870k31068k2448k64Þ
2ðð3kþ4Þð3kþ1Þð3k2þ10kþ4ÞÞ2Þ which is strictly
negative for k4 1.6. This implies for all k4 1.6, that there exists y1(k)
and y2(k) satisfying 0 < y1ðkÞ < 12 < y2ðkÞ < 1 such that pB(M )5 pB(T ) for
all y2 (y1 (k), y2 (k)).
Proof of Proposition 3
The total surplus, denoted by S, when technology adoption takes place is
given by
S ¼ 1
2
ðqA1ðM;TÞ þ qB1ðM;TÞÞ2
þ 1
2
ðqA2ðM;MÞ þ qB2ðM;MÞÞ2 þ pAðMÞ þ pBðMÞ ð12Þ
where qit(lit,ljt) and pi(M ) (i, j¼A,B,i 6¼ j, t¼ 1,2;) are obtained using
equations (4) – (7). In the absence of the possibility of technology adoption
(i.e.M¼T ) we have that dSdyjy¼12 ¼ 0. In the presence of technology adoption
with parameter values M¼ 2,T¼ 1 we have dSdyjy¼12 ¼
3kð5k448k280k16Þ
ð4þ3k2þ10kÞ3 6¼ 0
(unless k¼ 3.753). This implies that, in the presence of technology adoption,
surplus is not generally maximized at y ¼ 12. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider 4(ii) ﬁrst. We substituteM¼ 2 and T¼ 1 in the expression for cmp in
equation (11). We have that (a) cp(m)7 cp¼ 0 when y¼ 0, and (b)
limy!0ðdcpðmÞdy  dcpdy Þ ¼ 3k
2ð12þ65kþ104k2þ48k3Þ
8ðð1þ4kÞ2ð1þkÞ2Þ > 0. Together (a) and (b) imply
that there exists y 2 ð0; 1Þ such that cp(m)4 cp for y < y. This proves 4(i).
Proposition 4(ii) follows from noting that cp(m)7 cp is continuous in y and
limy!1 cpðmÞ  cp ¼  3k
2ð12kþ5Þ
2ð1þ2kÞð8kþ1Þð1þkÞð1þ4kÞ < 0.
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